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The present contribution addresses only a selected number of questions raised by the 
Green Paper. These questions were chosen bearing in mind that the Chaudfontaine 
Group could possibly make a specific contribution to the broad public debate 
launched by the European Commission through the Green Paper.  
 
While preparing the answers, we have set up six informal working groups, each 
dedicated to one particular element of a Trade Control Regime: 
- Extension of the scope of authorisation; 
- Common risk assessment and review procedure; 
- Catch-all controls; 
- Transit and brokering controls; 
- Systematic information exchange. 
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Introduction: A new export control model 
 
The definition of a new export control model for the European Union (EU) would 
seem to imply that the European Union already benefits from an export control 
framework. However, considering the nature of the regime established by Regulation 
428/2009, it is quite apparent that it does not constitute a proper export control 
regime, but rather a coordination of the different Members States’ regimes. The 
Regulation did nevertheless establish common principles and elements to be 
implemented nationally.  
Except for the legally binding nature of the Regulation, the level of constraints it 
imposes upon the Member States is similar to the set of obligations established by the 
international export control regimes. 
 
Besides that the EU might reach agreement in a near future on the establishment of a 
single EU regime, a truly common trade control currently appears to be politically 
unacceptable for the Member States. Therefore, the evolution of the regime could 
only be strengthened by the adoption of principle(s) that would define the potential 
architecture of its reform.  
The reform will have to find the right balance between the three core elements: 
- EU Regulation and national regulations; 
- Competiveness and security;  
- Soft law and/or hard law. 
 
Consequently, the following elements of a trade control system could be organised 
and transferred to the EU level: 
- List of controlled items; 
- Criteria and potential conditions; 
- Catch-all clause principles; 
- Authorisation system and categories; 
- EU territorial validity of authorisations;  
- Certification and ICP constraint; 
- Information exchange; 
- Intra-EU coordination. 
 
Finally, any attempt to compare the EU regime with that of its main trade competitors 
will not be accurate, unless such comparison takes into consideration each national 
regime which might be either more or less constraining or restrictive. 
 
Under any circumstance, seen from the perspective of competition, and of security, 
the EU regime as well as national regimes of the Member States should impose 




Theme: Extending the scope of authorisations? 
 
Answers to questions 10, 43, 44 and 45 
 
 
Under the current EU regime of export control of dual-use items existing rules 
provide enough flexibility for Member States to apply appropriate licenses for their 
national industries and traders. It should be emphasised however that they are not 
harmonised and vary across the European Union - ranging from tough / high 
restrictions in some Member States, to broad national facilitation measures and even 
exemptions in the others. These rules do not adequately address some of the 
challenges that stem from the new threats to EU security, i.e. different definitions of 
the concept of “security” among the Member States. Thus, 27 interpretations should 
be overcome and replaced by a common understanding of “security – threat” at least 
in the dual-use field. Moreover, particular attention should be paid to the rapid 
technological progress. Therefore, the proposal to include six new EU General Export 
Authorisations (GEAs) could facilitate the export of dual-use items. Whereas the 
GEA mechanism is generally welcomed by exporters, its practical relevance is 
questioned. Therefore, it should be seriously revised in order to ensure effectiveness 
of the use of the EU GEAs.  
 
Among revision measures, we propose establishment of an ex-post reporting 
obligation, which might shorten the administrative procedures. In addition, an 
introduction of common EU general licenses and gradual withdrawal of national 
general licenses would lead to more clarity for both licensing authorities and industry. 
Before introducing the new EU GEAs, it would however be important to know how 
many authorisations or other types of permissions would thereby be replaced so as to 
remove the administrative burden from the Member States and, to what extent they 
would be valuable to exporters. Introduction of new EU GEAs could be linked to 
certain conditions as for example a certification of exporters. A new EU GEA to be 
considered could be for instance an EU GEA for intra-company transfers, for special 
projects (i.e. building a nuclear power plant) or for EU research programs.  
 
Despite the positive expectations, there are also some concerns that the beneficial 
effect might not be as important as it is perceived, due to the fact that some EU GEAs 
would cover similar items and destinations as the existing national GAs. Moreover, 
certain Member States might also be reluctant to accept GEAs for certain items or 
destinations in light of national security concerns. Member States may therefore need 
greater assurances as for example common risk assessment for a given export.  
At this stage, it might be legitimate to have both national GAs and EU GEAs rather 
than phasing out national GAs. EU GEAs contain, indeed, conditions established by 
consensus which takes a long time to be reached. 
 
Although there is a common definition of the national GA, the understanding of its 
meaning differs among the 27 Member States. The validity of licenses among the 27 
varies widely too. In order to introduce an additional harmonisation, there might be a 
need to go further in the definition. The elaboration of common understanding 
however, is crucial.  
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The EU GEA is an instrument to facilitate trade but it could have negative security 
implications. The concept of “security”, however, is perceived differently among the 
27 Member States. There is thus a need for unification of the interpretation of the 
concept of security and threats in this field.  
Harmonising? Yes, but can it be “one size fits all”? 
  
More outreach as well as enforcement actions are needed towards industry. Audits are 
one of the most efficient enforcement tools for countries using national GAs; 
moreover they also raise the awareness of industry. Hence, a number of questions 
could be raised: having more foreign trade company audits across EU Member 
States? Would the option of a EU global license be the best possible way forward? 
Considering that possibility, which body would be in a position to issue such EU 
global license? 
 
When comparing the EU and the US export control regimes, it should be noted that 
the US apply extraterritorial controls over their dual-use goods and can thereby better 
cover their security interests than the EU. This means that the US has the possibility 
to follow goods after the export has taken place. However, it should be noted that 
license exceptions in the US are strictly tailored on national economic and security 
interests. Hence, it will not be at all beneficial for the EU to simply copy these 
exemptions. A thorough analysis is required to determine how these exceptions could 
facilitate EU exports and enhance competitiveness and at the same time stimulate EU 
Member States to analyse their exports in that light. It will allow an appropriate use of 
all tools already provided by the Regulation in order to achieve the balance of security 
and trade interests. The EU could also consider the US practice of having a broader 
scope of application as far as the “privileged countries” are concerned. However, due 
to the underlying different national control systems this mechanism might be 
envisaged - only to a limited extent. 
 
A comprehensive detailed comparison of the EU export control system and that of 
other, notably competitors, countries could serve as a useful tool for further analysis. 
To take an example: the licensing process in the EU is much stricter as well as slower 
than that of the US, which tends to weaken the competitiveness of EU companies in 
third countries. Moreover, because it is difficult to define a common EU “policy” 
towards sensitive countries, there is much reluctance in issuing export authorisations 
thereto. This leads to a limitation of such markets for the EU companies. Hence while 
the EU companies are not allowed to export dual-use items to certain countries, the 
US and Russia are taking over markets in these regions. 
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Theme: Common risk assessment and reviews procedures 
 
Answers to questions 8, 9, 26, 27 and 40 
 
Question 8: Have you encountered any problems due to differences in the application 
of export controls across the EU Member States? What was the nature of these 
problems? 
 
a) Competitiveness:  
Companies that operate in several countries of the EU encounter differences in 
licensing procedures. This means that the paperwork involved in exporting an 
item is complicated and may take an unnecessarily long time, due to having to 
comply with different rules in the different Member States. While comparing 
companies in the US and the EU, for example, European companies are being 
disadvantaged due to these difficulties, which drive up costs and prolong the 
time it takes to export, and therefore hurt competitiveness. 
 
b) Security concern: 
There is an intuitive argument that too many strict rules in one country will 
simply push customers to buy from companies in a country with more flexible 
rules. If the importer acquires items for peaceful purposes, the hope would be 
that the rules for the exporters are not so complex that they prevent perfectly 
“safe” exports. However, if the importer seeks to use the imports for other 
purposes such as a clandestine nuclear weapons program, the hope would be 
that rules would not be so lax as to allow for such operation. A balance must be 
struck - the greater the harmonisation between EU Member States, the less the 
probability that dubious importers would succeed in acquiring the desired items.  
 
c) Common risk assessment: 
An indirectly related obstacle to a common application is the lack of 
information sharing among Member States. Enhancement of the exchange of 
information would help preventing that Member States have different outcomes 
in risk assessments, and would avoid having “weak links” in the chain of 
European export controls.  
 
d) Outreach:  
One must not forget that the EU’s enlargement policy is a powerful tool that 
should be used to strengthen export controls in countries willing to become 
Member States, i.e. Balkan States or Turkey. Harmonised export control 
licensing procedures increases the probability that candidate countries will 
implement Regulation 428/2009 effectively as well as bring their countries 









Question 9: Do you think that the current EU dual-use control framework provides a 
level playing field for EU exporters? If not, how is any unevenness demonstrated? 
Please provide examples. 
  
First, it is clear that exports depend on a number of variables that are independent 
from the EU dual-use export control framework, e.g. the strength of the currencies of 
EU Member States, demand for nuclear energy, political considerations and the nature 
of the individual exporter (a small company exporting one or two items or 
multinational firms). However, if it is assumed for the argument, that these specific 
factors are equal across EU Member States - the only difference being the 
implementation of the dual-use framework - it is evident that the present framework 
does not go far enough in providing a level playing field for exporters. The simple 
reason is that each country implements Regulation 428/2009 differently thus causing 
unevenness. This is manifest in the differences pertaining to the following factors: 
- The time it takes to obtain a license; 
- The cost of obtaining a license; 
- The open question as to whether a license is eventually granted. 
 
These factors, analyzed more accurately, are due to: 
- Differences in the licensing procedures in each country; 
- The structure and efficiency of the licensing body; 
- Inter-agency review(s); 
- Information-sharing (timely, accurate, and availability of relevant information 
at low cost). 
 
Until these factors are harmonised among EU Member States, the industrial 




Question 26: Do you think that the criteria set out in Article 12 are clear and precise 
enough or not? 
 
The description of the criteria of Article 12 is quite general. Nevertheless, the point 
made to the Member States is clear: States need to be vigilant in granting licenses in 
view of their existing international legal commitments and with special regard to the 
nature of the end-user. 
In order to obtain better harmonisation of license risk assessment, the EU should aim 
at establishing more precise license assessment criteria. This concerns especially 
Article 12 c) and d) where reference is made to the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
related to the assessment criteria for military equipment (c) and, intended end-use and 
risk of diversion (d). The question is whether more detailed specifications should be 
adopted in the regulation (hard law), or whether the objective could be reached by soft 
law, e.g. by providing a user’s guide adapted to the assessment of dual-use items and 
stipulating how could be assessed the risk of end-users and risk of diversion, by more 
information sharing, and entrusting the EU with a bigger role in consultation 
procedures such as on denied licenses.  
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Experience shows that the adoption of new legislation takes time and does not 
necessarily always reach better results in terms of harmonisation. Although 
amendments to Article 12 of the Regulation could be foreseen in the long term 
(legislation should not be too “restrictive”), the preferred immediate option is to aim 
at more harmonisation by way of non-legislative initiatives. Member States do not 
necessarily need new legislation on this matter, but they would benefit from more 
coordination and exchange of information. Initiatives that prove to be efficient in 
applying the Regulation could be later introduced in the Regulation (“bottom-up” 
approach). The role of the Commission could be extended with a view to achieve a 
more common risk assessment. However, the Commission is principally seen as a 




Question 27: Is there a need to harmonize to a greater degree the criteria used by 
Member States to assess export applications? If so, how? 
 
There is indeed a need for more harmonisation, both for reasons of equal competition 
and for a better security control. There are several steps that could be taken in this 
regard: 
 





b)  More information sharing. This would not mean only information sharing on 
denials, but also frequent meetings and good communication between 
licensing officers of different Member States, thus facilitating an exchange of 
information on methods, best practices, opinions, interpretation of the law, of 
the list of dual-use items, etc. Encouraging a greater sense of community 
between the export control officials of the different Member States will 
inevitably lead to greater harmonisation. The European Commission has a 
coordinating role to play in this, notably:   
- By changing the language in the Regulation on the long run
3
 so as to be 
clearer and more specific, especially for Article 12 (d), and set up more 
precise guidelines for the auditing of companies. 
- By adopting a user’s guide adapted to exports of dual-use items in order to 
assist Member States in a harmonised implementation of Article 12. The 
user’s guide that already exists for military items could be therefore a source 
of inspiration.  
- By establishing a ‘facilitating’ role for the Commission in the consultation 
procedure between Member States in case of denials or sensitive license 
applications.  
- By entrusting, possibly, SitCen with a role of information sharing on 
destinations/specific end-users upon request of a Member State.  
 
                                                        
2  See answer to question 40 for more details. 
3  See question 26. 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c)  The establishment of a list of sensitive countries (“black list”) is not advisable in 
the EU context. However, clear and specific EU sanctions based, in particular, on 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions (such as those on Iran or 
North Korea) contribute to achieving better harmonisation.  
 
 
Question 40: What are your views concerning the establishment of a common 
approach to risk assessment, which would be used by all licensing authorities for the 
purpose of licensing procedures? 
 
The actual assessment will continue to be carried out by Member States’ 
governments. It is unlikely that a central EU body would be set up in order to take 
over this governmental task. A decentralized system benefits, however, from closer 
contacts with industry and improved knowledge of local production.  
 
Nevertheless, a formal technical body could be set up (or one could use the working 
groups and the pool of experts already in place, and assign them this particular task) 
to draw a user’s guide for a common risk assessment for dual-use goods
4
. It would be 
a challenge as to availability of resources, coordination and brainpower to develop an 
effective method of risk assessment that would yield significant long-term advantages 
for the dual-use framework. Such a system would require a large amount of accurate 
and reliable information based not only on practice of denials, but also on other 
information.  
 
What?: The central question: what is the risk stemming from a particular export?  
How?: What elements should be analysed /taken into account? 
- Nature of the item involved; 
- Importing company; 
- Country of importing company; 
- Infrastructure; level of development of the company(ies) involved; 
- Political/security context of importing country; 
- Export controls in importing country. 
 
The technical body would come up with elaborated and detailed description of what 
should be considered, how it should be done and would set up standards to assess the 





4 See also question 27. 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Theme: Intra-EU Controls 
 
Answers to questions 50, 51 and 52 
 
(50) Would you support the idea of replacing license requirements for intra-EU 
transfers with a post-shipment verification mechanism? 
 
It appears that the post-shipment verification mechanism would be more complicated 
than the existing licensing system. The operators would be required to register all the 
intra-EU transfers, prepare reports about the transferred goods and their transactions 
to the licensing authorities. The commonly perceived lack of trust between the 
Member States makes such a system difficult to imagine or if introduced, it seems a 
heavier administrative burden would be imposed onto the companies involved. The 
post-shipment verification system on the other hand would change the existing 
licensing regime, and would remove the approval rights, the discretion of the Member 
States about the transferring transactions. This would certainly improve today’s 
situation. Licensing procedures are the rule in all Member States, but obtaining a 
license may take considerable time in some Member States as compared to others, 
thereby hindering the smooth conduct of trade (including the free movement of 
goods) in the Single Market. 
 
A disadvantage of the post-shipment verification mechanism would be that the 
administrative burden would not be effectively reduced. Some Member States’ 
authorities are of the opinion that issuing an authorisation is less of a burden to the 
authority than verifying the shipment after it has taken place. Auditing the companies 
in the framework of compliance checks might need more resources and skilled staff, 
than issuing intra-EU transfer licenses. Moreover, such a post-shipment verification 
method would switch the burden from the transferring to the receiving Member State. 
So the recipient Member States might face a much bigger administrative burden, due 
to the fact, that a post-shipment verification mechanism involves the authorities of the 
receiving Member States’ authorities to endorse the arrival of the goods transferred 
(similarly to the International Import Certificates). Another problem would be the 
verification of the transactions involving intangible technology, how an endorsement 
could take place for the authorities. A post-shipment verification model excluding the 
endorsement of the transactions by the recipient’s authorities would be one preferred 
model. This would entail a great reliance on the transferring companies and give them 
greater liberty as compared to present system.   
 
Besides further exploring possibilities for a post-shipment mechanism a quick 
solution would be to liberalize the transfer of non-sensitive goods and to keep the 
control mechanisms only for the very sensitive “Annex IV” items.  
 
 
(51) Would you agree with the idea of replacing license requirements for intra-EU 
transfers with the introduction of certified end-users described above? 
 
In general this would help the operators in conducting their transfers more easily. It 
could be an additional procedure next to the licensing. The certified company scheme 
could be used.  However, in most cases such a system would still be an administrative 
burden for most of the certifying national authorities. It requires considerable efforts 
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and the incurring administrative costs are not negligible, moreover the administrative 
burden for companies in submitting to the certification procedure might be also 
considerable (e.g. security aspects, introduction of an ICP).  
 
The main problem is due to the fact that Annex IV contains very diverse items and 
that the companies involved in their trade are very diverse as well. The system of 
certified end-users could be however a positive step if applied only for the nuclear 
sector (and nuclear items). It is not clear if the same regulation would work 
sufficiently well to cover chemical, biological or other regime items contained in 
Annex IV. That part of the list should in our view be deleted, as noted above 
 
 
(52) Would you have any other ideas that would allow for a progressive reduction of 
intra-EU transfer controls? 
 
a)  As a first step we recommend to reduce the number of items on the list in 
Annex IV keeping only the sensitive nuclear items. Eventually, the whole list 
should be deleted. 
 
b)  We would further recommend introducing of EU general license for the 
remaining Annex IV. Items (validity only for intra-EU transfers) while 
maintaining the individual licensing scheme for certain very sensitive items, if 
there is a strong resistance from Member States (this should be eventually 
deleted). In the EU general authorisation, which should become the rule, a 
similar mechanism for registration, notification and reporting requirements 





Theme: Catch-all controls 
 
Answers to questions 18, 19, 46, 47 and 48 
 
In general, it should be underlined that catch-all control is a flexible, subtle and useful 
instrument which gives Member States the possibility to put on a “yellow light” for 
industry. It also provides exporters with some additional time for a careful assessment 
of the potential export, rather than issuing an immediate denial.  
 
The catch-all control should however not be understood as denial. The language of 
the relevant provisions of the Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 (in particular 
Articles 4, 8 and 13) is too general and sometimes ambiguous, which leads to major 
problems regarding equal application across the EU. 
 
A need for a clear and common understanding of catch-all controls 
  
Provisions of Article 4 are subject to various interpretations by Member States  
(some consider a catch-all requirement as a denial while other see it as a security 
measure to improve the control). In particular, wording of the Article 4, paragraph 6, 
on responsibility of other Member States to “give all due consideration” to a catch-all 
notification does not oblige them clearly enough to actually control the “caught” 
items. Practice of some Member States shows that when a Member State issues a 
catch-all notification, it could apply also in another Member State on the basis of a 
gentlemen’s agreement. However, some other Member States, after analysing the 
notified catch-all, may decide that they do not perceive the same level of risk and 
would not consider a need to apply the catch-all against their own exporters. 
Moreover, according to the Regulation, States do not even have to undertake the 
consultation procedure as envisaged in Article 13. Thus, there exists an urgent need 
for a harmonised interpretation of relevant provisions. 
 
Effects of the current situation are that: 
- There is no uniform application of catch-all controls across the EU; 
- Proliferators may have access to goods and technologies prohibited by one or   
more Member State(s); 
- The result is an uneven playing field for exporters. 
  
This undermines the non-proliferation aims of the Regulation. The most disturbing 
result being the negative influence on mutual trust among EU Member States and 




A common understanding of a catch-all clause should undertake following measures: 
 
- A national catch-all control should be valid in all Member States. This should 
include mandatory information dissemination to custom authorities of all 
Member States and consultations as envisaged in Article 4(7).  
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- The procedure of imposing a control on the items caught by another Member 
State and the consultation mechanism in such case should be clearly set forth 
(its validity, detailed information in a notification, obligations for other 
Member States, consultation procedure, dissemination of information to 
customs and industry). 
 
These aims could be achieved either by amending the wording of the Regulation (hard 
law) or by including them in the EU Guidelines regarding the Regulation (soft law). 
 
Enhanced role of intelligence and outreach to the industry 
General recommendations regarding national practice: 
- The above mentioned proposal would mean that a national authority informs 
its industry in the case a catch-all has been imposed by another Member State 
on its products. This requires the authority to know the industry, which may be 
challenging in light of the particular size of the industry. There could be also 
difficulties in reaching occasional dual-use exporters. However, production of 
the most sensitive dual-use items usually is, or should be of special interest of 
the authorities and their intelligence services. Hence it should not be a major 
difficulty to identify entities concerned.   
- The outreach activities aimed at the industry would help the authority to better 
know its partners and their products. This would also contribute in order to 
improve cooperation with the authorities on the side of the industry, which is 
especially important in the context of Articles 4(4) and 4(5). 
 
Enhanced common risk assessment through the use of information contained in 
the catch-all notifications  
 
There is a need to converge the risk assessment of all Member States. This could be 
achieved by a thorough analysis of the information contained in the catch-all 
notifications (exporters, consignees, end-users, end-use purpose). 
 
The information obtained from the catch-all notifications could provide elements for a 
database with efficient search engines, which would be used by Member States’ 
licensing and intelligence authorities in conducting risk assessment of new 
application. This would facilitate the dissemination of information and contribute to a 
decrease of uncertainty in the process of licensing and more convergent results of the 
risk assessment by the Member States. 
One of the EU bodies (SitCen, the Commission, the EEAS or other) could be also 
tasked to provide the Member States with analyses based on the database concerning 
end-users, risk profiling, trends in licensing, etc. The analyses would not be binding in 
any sense and would serve only for informative purposes of the Member State. 
 
Avoid the risk of over-control and strive for less burden on the exporters 
 
Any improvements to the functioning of the catch-all controls in the EU should take 
into account the question of competitiveness of the European Union industry and 
should not lead to overregulation. Due attention should be also given to more 
permissive legal regulations applied to exports by other States.  
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Since there is no centralised monitoring system for national catch-all authorisations 
(there is only a database for catch-all denials) a central focal point within the EU 
could be possibly set up in order to remedy the situation. Such focal point would 
provide a database of the national catch-all licenses and denials which would serve as 
a stimulus for the Member State to observe other Member States’ catch-all controls 
and provide a level playing field for the exporters. The focal point would distribute 
the information to national authorities and keep a database available to them. 
 
  16 
Theme: Transit and brokering controls 
 





Two points should be raised here concerning the definition of transit per se. The first 
is a fundamental one and concerns what should be considered transit under the dual-
use Regulation. It would seem that the transit definition in Council Regulation 
2913/92 or Community Customs Code (CCC) as it is known, differs from the 
definition set out in the dual-use Regulation. Questions such as when a given transit 
procedure should be interrupted and replaced by a procedure for re-export must be 
interpreted homogeneously by all Member States. It is not surprising that for instance 
in the case of a change of destination of a dual-use good in transit or of a change of 
means of transport (trans-shipment) there are different perceptions not only among 
Member States but also - in some cases - between the licensing and the customs 
authorities
5
. Any misunderstanding originating from different interpretations can be 
eliminated if a broader definition of transit is introduced at the EU level.   
 
It must also be said that the CCC contains a number of provisions related to transit of 
Community and non-Community goods and, therefore, some “grey areas” regarding 
transit provisions of the dual-use Regulation that might or should be interpreted on the 
basis of the CCC. For instance, Article 36a of the CCC provides that “goods brought 
into the customs territory of the Community shall be covered by a summary 
declaration, with the exception of goods carried on means of transport only passing 
through the territorial waters or the airspace of the customs territory without a stop 
within this territory”
6
. Moreover, the dual-use Regulation refers itself to the CCC for 
the definition of other relevant customs procedures such as the export and re-export. 
 
Second, it seems that there is an effort of the legislator to “narrow” the scope of the 
transit controls of listed items in cases with a primarily WMD application since the 
transit of dual-use goods may be prohibited “[I]f the items are or may be intended for 
use in WMD application”. Although such a condition is logical for non-listed items, it 
is not appropriate for the listed dual-use items, which have by definition a potential 
military use. However, the scope of the transit controls is rather focused on the most 
risky cases, i.e. WMD application as described in Article 4(1). This fact may reflect 
the providence of the legislator regarding the acknowledged difficulty of conducting 
transit controls for a wide range of shipments.  
 
A third remark has to do with the nature of the transit provisions in the current dual-
use Regulation. Article 6 “establishes the possibility for Member States to submit on a 
                                                        
5
 This is also a consequence of the absence of the “on the ground” perception of the 
enforcement officers in the drafting of the EU and national legislation and of the inadequate 
in some cases co-operation between different agencies within a Member State. 
6
  Although the Article 36a means that the transit by ship and airplane through the Union’s 
territory without a stop is not controlled, there are possibilities for Member States to stop the 
transit if there strong grounds for suspicious transports. The Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) for instance is a non-legally binding tool which predicts however in exceptional cases 
the stop/control of a suspicious ship/cargo even in the international waters. 
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case-by-case basis a transit operation to authorisation” and also provides the 
opportunity for other national measures (e.g. catch-all possibility) pursuant to 
effective control of dual-use in transit. Therefore, it does not appear to be possible to 
achieve a harmonised application of transit provisions considering that transit 




Implementation of controls: 
 
The second step in analysis of the functioning of the current EU transit control system 
is the examination of the implementation of the legal provisions, which as is the case 
with almost all provisions of the dual-use Regulation lies in the hands of Member 
States.  
 
Generally, all items brought into the territory of the EU are subject to customs 
supervision until assigned a customs treatment or use
8
 (Article 37 of CCC). Since 1
st
 
January 2011, an entry/exit summary declaration is mandatory for goods entering and 
exiting the -territory. This requirement can facilitate transit controls since this 
summary declaration provides the basic information on the transaction (e.g. country 
of origin, consignee, HS code, value, destination), which is essential for the 
electronically automated risk management process. During this process the nature/sort 
of items, the accompanying documents and especially the end-use, and the end-use 
destination are controlled and verified and, in case of a suspicious transit further 
investigation can be made. At this stage a transit or re-export authorisation can be 
required depending on the nature of the transaction (e.g. a few Member States 
consider that the transit procedure is interrupted in case of a change of destination and 
a re-export license should be required with all the ensuing legal consequences). In 
case of a transit prohibition there are essentially 5 scenarios (release to free 
circulation, movement to another member-state, re-export to the country of origin, re-
export to a non-sensitive country and destruction of the items), which are not all 
equally applicable, meaning that it rests on the discretion of the competent authorities 
to decide on the most appropriate solutions. Possible action of the owner or- 
transporter of such items can be as follows: either appeal against the decision, 
acceptance of the decision, or no response. 
 
The implementation of the transit controls, which are summarily described above, 
might involve a number of practical problems that should be handled in a common 
way at EU level. The Commission’s guidelines that are currently being drafted might 





 See also “The European Union Dual-Use Items Control Regime: Comment of the 
Legislation: article-by-article”, Pr. Dr. Quentin Michel, Liège, August 2011, Article 6 EU-
dual-use Regulation, p. 45. 
8
 “There are generally five possibilities for a “Customs-approved treatment use of goods”:  
(a) the placing of goods under a customs procedure; 
(b) their entry into a free zone or free warehouse; 
(c) their re-exportation from the customs territory of the Community; 
(d) their destruction; 
(e) their abandonment to the Exchequer.” 
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We tried also to outline the most important problems concerning the implementation 
of transit controls, namely: 
First of all, the detection and the physical inspection of goods in transit present some 
special difficulties. Any decision to open or unload a shipment in transit must be 
based on reliable information; otherwise it may cause unjustifiable transaction costs to 
licit transports or even lead to legal consequences for the customs officers involved. 
In addition, the extreme amount of cargos trading every day and the peculiarities of 
transit controls (e.g. limited time for the inspection, need for strong back-up from 
intelligence agencies) can give an idea of the difficulties involved in the detection of 
an illegal transit. A high level of inter-agency co-operation, a timely access to quality 
information and an efficient information exchange between Member States can much 
enhance the effectiveness of transit controls.  
 
Some other controversial issues are:  
- Who will be the addressee of a transit authorisation or prohibition? 
- What if the addressee of a requirement is established outside the EU? 
- Who will bear the cost of storage for intercepted items? 
- What about the duration of retention of a shipment?  
The CCC can provide some answers to the above questions but a common approach 
to these issues at the EU level may be far more appropriate for the functioning of a 




Bearing in mind the provisions, the shortfalls and the potential solutions of the EU 
transit control system it is appropriate to emphasize here some more general 
conclusions so as to better target the relevant questions of the Commission’s Green 
Paper.  
First, it seems that there is no reason to extend the scope of transit controls to cover 
transactions from the EU to third countries. The dual-use Regulation, the CCC and the 
national legislation set out by the EU and the Member States respectively, adequately 
regulate the different transit cases. What could be useful is the amendment of the 
transit definition in the dual-use Regulation in a way that encompasses the most 
common transit cases in order to avoid any confusion or conflict with the Community 
customs law. 
 
However, the transit controls “suffer” from the same problems that are encountered or 
even characterize the entire EU export control system for dual-use goods. What we 
mean is that, for instance, the limited territorial validity of transit authorisations and 
prohibitions can undermine the “no-undercut principle” since a transit cargo may be 
allowed to be exported from one Member State while a similar case has already been 
prohibited by another Member State. In some cases it has been noticed that the transit 
of one cargo may need multiple export authorisations provided by different Member 
States. 
 
Transit controls as described earlier, allow by their very nature the non-equal 
appliance of controls at national level. Further bearing in mind that transit controls 
rely heavily on information exchange and inter-agency co-operation, high 
quality/level of information exchange (e.g. at formal level through the dual-use 
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exchange system DUES) between Member States and with the Commission is 
arguably a prerequisite to achieve an optimal functioning of the system. Another 
relevant domain is that of risk management: the establishment of common criteria and 
approaches for the assessment of different cases could be particularly useful for the 
detection of suspicious transit cases. 
 
To conclude, it should be underlined that the limited territorial validity of transit 
prohibitions is an obstacle in the build up of a harmonious system, as is the case with 
the “ordinary” catch-all prohibition for the export of dual-use goods. Finally, 
compliance with the consultation/information procedures referred to in Articles 13 
and 19, combined with the establishment of a common risk management process 
could ensure fruitful results of the efforts undertaken for a more effective and 





Currently, there seems to be no need to extend the scope of brokering controls to 
transactions undertaken from the EU to third countries. The following paragraphs 
explain in some detail the reasons for this assessment. 
 
Considering a low number of upcoming cases in several Member States, brokering 
controls are not relevant in practice as compared to the other licensing export control 
burden. Moreover, Member States that extended the European export control 
provisions by implementing further national controls, with reference to Article 5 (2) 
and (3) of the EU Regulation, do not have necessarily more brokering cases for 
control than countries that have not implemented the extended controls.  
 
The introduction of additional controls for brokering is not considered being 
necessary since the brokering activity would be already sufficiently covered in the 
framework of the export control licensing process and by a common export 
authorisations. A further control could create confusion, if a double licensing 
authorisation is required. This would be unnecessarily time-consuming for the actors 
engaged and would increase the administrative burden. 
 
Although, taking into account some reports and discussions with Member States one 
may conclude that the main objective of brokering controls might be deterrence. It is 
however evident that the main instrument for deterrence is provided by the existing 
sanction system. Its implementation remains in the competence of Member States, 
which should be encouraged to introduce penal provisions in their relevant laws 
considering that only few countries have implemented such provisions or are 
currently discussing their introduction. 
 
In addition it is necessary to take into account the difficulties of detection of brokers. 
The working area of brokers seems to be fairly unknown to most authorities that 
never follow up corresponding cases. We therefore do recommend the introduction of 




. However, it is important to note, that a register does not appear to be 
useful since even registered brokers can easily act from abroad, outside the EU, which 
would not be covered by the regulation. 
 
Information exchange is an appropriate instrument to discuss cases and keep Member 
States with less relevant experience informed about possible developments within the 
EU. Such exchange of experience even between national authorities concerning their 
specific challenges in this matter may be sufficient to improve controls. 
 
Finally, key definitions of terms contained in Article 5(1) of the dual-use Regulation 
such as “being informed” and “being aware” remain unidentified. This leads to 
different interpretations of these concepts by the individual Member States. Some 
Member States also ask for a more extensive harmonisation of terms “broker” and 
“brokering activities” since national legislations adopted in other EU Member States 





 “The European Union Dual-Use Items Control Regime: Comments of the Legislation: 
article-by-article”, Pr. Dr. Quentin Michel, Liège, August 2011, Article 5 dual-use 
Regulation, p. 43. 
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Theme: Information exchange 
 
Answers to questions 41 and 42 
 
 
The importance of information exchange for the consistency of the EU export control 
regime is hardly disputable. This issue is essential for almost every aspect of common 
trade policy and, more particularly, for the harmonised approach thereto.  
 
Hence, the question of information exchange could be analysed in two parts.  
 
Primarily, a scope for general enhancement of information sharing should be 
analyzed. It should be emphasized that main difficulties stem from the degree of 
specification of the shared information rather than from its availability. Numerous 
discussion forums on both international (export control regimes, international 
organisations) and EU (Dual-Use Working Group, Article 23 Coordination Group) 
levels are presently available to authorities involved in export control policies. 
However, there is a clear necessity for better coordination between Member States, 
which is hardly possible without a common repository of sensitive information.  
 
Recently, the Commission has established a denial database accessible to national 
licensing authorities and, for the most parts, for the Customs. We are very much in 
favour of this initiative and would like to propose to enlarge the scope thereof. 
Indeed, it could be relevant to integrate a new functionality to the aforesaid system, 
thereby expanding it to catch-all notifications. Actually, the current approach on 
information sharing mainly focuses on the ex-post analysis. In other words, Member 
States will share the information on denials, which have already been issued. 
Therefore, we suggest to add a proactive component and introduce ex-ante 
information sharing of catch-all.  
 
Moreover, the Member States might also establish various types of watch lists meant 
to raise the vigilance of national licensing and customs authorities. Accordingly, a 
watch list of sensitive destinations and that of suspicious end-users could be 
envisaged. Even if such lists should imperatively be available only for the 27, we are 
aware of numerous difficulties that this initiative might entail. In particular, a 
consensus of all Member States on a watch list of sensitive countries would be 
undoubtedly very hard to achieve. Given that this issue includes considerations 
related to national external trade and foreign policies, it might be more appropriate to 
focus on an intra-EU database on suspicious end-users/exporters. In order to increase 
the added value of this database, national industries should also be involved in the 
establishment thereof.  
 
As concerns the practical and timely aspects of the enforcement of information 
sharing mechanisms, we recommend to explore the idea of creating a comprehensive 
table of the different types of information to be exchanged.  Such table would take 
into account the specificities and priorities of the risks, such as the fight against the 
WMD proliferation, the counter-terrorism, the essential security interests of one or 
more Member States, the protection of human rights and the compliance with 
international humanitarian law. 
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In addition, in order to settle precisely which categories of data should be shared, a 
common risk assessment has to be further investigated. However, before going into 
deeper analysis the main question to be considered is:  “what is the risk”. The concept 
of “risk” is relative and principally stems from national policies of Member States. 
The risk-assessment exercise may cover different scenarios such as a WMD 
proliferation, a military end-use or a risk of diversion. The same reality might be 
assessed as “risk” or “danger” or even “threat”, depending on the level, the 
predictability of an event or the State that characterises this risk for itself. 
 
While assessing a possible scope of pertinent risk assessment, we have focused on the 
elements listed in the following, thus completing the model proposed in the Green 
Paper. Firstly, the actors involved (assessing the “who?”), with particular emphasis on 
suspicious destinations and dubious end-users, exporters and brokers. Secondly, the 
technical aspects (assessing the “what?”) in particular as regards the adequacy of the 
item or technology to be exported correspond with the stated end use. Finally, the 
contextual factors (assessing the “what for?”), including notably the measures 
outlined for the verification of the stated end use and the perceived risks of diversion. 
We consider that the EU information exchange model should imperatively address the 
aforesaid elements.  
 
Given that the dual-use related matters constitute the exclusive competence of the EU, 
the role of the European Commission could be further formalised notably in order to 
reinforce information-sharing mechanisms. The Commission could therefore 
coordinate a new “task force” that would bring together the stakeholders directly 
dealing with the implementation of the export controls, such as national licensing and 
customs authorities and the exporters (since they already participate in IAEA risk-
assessment missions). Moreover, we emphasise that, notwithstanding the particular 
nature of their mission and the absence of formal and legally effective connection to 
the dual-use trade controls, the intelligence sources are major contributors to any risk-
assessment exercise. Hence, SitCen, that currently collects the information from 
national intelligence services, might feed risk-assessment efforts and discussions 
undertaken under the legislation and practices of dual-use trade controls, notably by 
answering questions provided on a case-by-case basis by the Member States and the 
Commission. 
 
We express the opinion that a consensus on the definition of risks, which is raison 
d’être of information sharing, cannot be reached in practice as long as Member States 
do not possess or do not access to the same information for conducting their national 
assessments. Intelligence and commercially sensitive information remain two clear 
limitations to a harmonised approach of risk analysis. Use must be made, therefore, of 
any structure aimed at bringing information resources closer, even if these efforts rely 
on areas of exclusive competences of the Member States. Any effort to link the 
definition of risks with the objective of better controlling of sensitive trade should 








Concerning information sharing, we propose: 
 
- To expand the scope of the existing information database to include 
information on catch-all applications; 
 
- Not to consider establishment of a “watch list” of suspicious destinations, but 
rather to concentrate on exchange of information on dubious end-users and 
exporters; 
 
- To establish a comprehensive table of major security threats and potential 
timelines for concrete application of ‘realistic’ information exchange 
mechanisms; 
 
- To calibrate the information to be shared on the assessment of the risk implied 
(“who?”, “what?” and “what for?”) by trade of dual-use items or technology; 
 
- To promote and/or create mechanisms for information sharing between the 
main bodies and stakeholders - both at European and Member States level - 
which would centralize information related to strategic trade and security. 
 
